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ABstRACt. A taxonomic approach to field research was developed and utilized to support 
empirical and experimental research findings into the impact that incentives/pressures to over-
value have on systematic valuation bias. An expected no-bias population was defined and valua-
tion judgments from actual, real-world appraisals were statistically tested against it. The judg-
ments of appraisers presented with no incentive/pressure to over-value were consistent with 
the no-bias population, while the judgments of appraisers presented with incentive/pressure to 
over-value were significantly incompatible with the defined no bias population.
KeYwoRDs: Real estate appraisal; mortgage lending; Valuation judgment; default risk;  
Client-agent impacts; Liquidity Crisis of 2008 
1. INtRoDUCtIoN
This research, conducted and documented 
in 2004, demonstrated the existence of in-
centives/pressures for residential appraisers 
to provide favorable valuations. Residential 
mortgage originators, whose compensation is 
contingent upon originating loans, have an 
incentive to influence appraisers, and this 
study provided strong evidence and loud warn-
ing well in advance of the Liquidity Crisis of 
2008 when such irresponsible agency behavior 
exacted terrible costs on worldwide financial 
markets. Because appraisals are used to esti-
mate borrowers’ equity, over-valuation of col-
lateral results in under-estimation of default 
risk. Originators typically pass on this inflated 
default risk by selling residential originations 
to secondary mortgage market agents, such as 
Fannie mae and Freddie mac. By reaping the 
benefits while bearing little of the costs, loan 
originators have a strong motivation to quiet-
ly maintain a system of appraisal incentives/
pressures that frustrates underwriting stand-
ards, overprices mortgage-backed assets, fuels 
speculative bubbles, and misrepresents the 
level of risk assumed by the investing commu-
nity thereby setting markets up for the next 
financial disaster. 
The question of whether or not incentives/
pressures to over-value result in systematic val-
uation bias has been studied both empirically 
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and experimentally. Evidence of bias emerged, 
but methods are not above question. Empirical 
studies rely upon databases that are left-tail 
truncated. They contain no information on ap-
praisals associated with rejected loans. Experi-
mental studies are always vulnerable to the 
criticism that no matter the level of fealty to 
real world conditions, laboratory settings are 
artificial and render generalization of results 
problematic. 
This paper introduces a taxonomic field 
study approach that does not suffer from the 
shortcomings described above. An expected, 
no-bias population of subjective value judg-
ments is defined, and the results of actual, 
real-world appraisals are statistically tested 
against the constructed no-bias population. 
While the findings of this work are dated, the 
innovative method outlined is as relevant to-
day as it was when the paper was circulated 
within the academic publishing community 
in 2004 and 2005 and rejected. Its utility for 
critical research and essential oversight is the 
motivation behind its resurrection here. 
The balance of this paper continues with 
a brief review of the relevant literature that 
stimulates the driving research hypothesis. 
The specification of a model of subjective val-
ue judgment precedes the development of data 
and a statistical test to examine the research 
hypotheses. Finally results and conclusions 
are offered. 
2. LIteRAtURe ReVIew AND 
ReseARCH HYPotHesIs
The issue of client pressure and bias in 
valuation judgment has been addressed both 
empirically and experimentally. For example, 
using a database of 600,000 residential mort-
gages purchased by Fannie mae in 1993, Chin-
loy, Cho and megbolugbe (1997) and Cho and 
megbolugbe (1996) discovered that 95% of the 
appraised values were greater than or equal to 
the pending sale price. This result was perhaps 
less than surprising given that low appraisals 
result in loan rejection or renegotiation and 
rejected loans were not represented in this da-
tabase (the truncated distribution problem). 
Noordewier, Harrison and Ramagopal (2001) 
investigated the relationship between default 
risk and over-valued collateral with a database 
of 1,428 residential loans from the portfolio of 
a national mortgage lender and concluded that 
loans on properties valued above the sale price 
of all comparable properties used in the ap-
praisal exhibited increased default risk. These 
studies suggested that over-valuation may 
be chronic and associated with increased de-
fault risk, but they provide no link between 
appraisal judgment and bias from incentives/
pressures to do business.
Experimental research has been introduced 
into real estate to help explain the behavior 
of market participants such as appraisers 
and hence is sometimes called behavioral re-
search. One stream of this literature, reviewed 
in diaz (2002), concluded that appraisers can 
be subject to many potentially biasing influ-
ences including the value opinions of others 
(diaz, 1997), their own previous value opinions 
(diaz and Wolverton, 1998), unclosed contract 
prices on subject and comparable properties 
(diaz and Hansz, 2001), and the pressures of 
clients. Of particular relevance to the develop-
ment of a research hypothesis for the present 
study was the research into client influences 
and pressures. 
Appraisers revealed on the postal survey/
experiment by kinnard, Lenk and Worzala 
(1997) that they felt pervasive client pressure 
and had a tendency to succumb to it especially 
when exerted by important clients and regard-
less of the size of the desired adjustment. Levy 
and Schuck (1999) found that both sophisti-
cated pressure, based on the use of property 
and market information, and unsophisticated 
pressure, based on the threat of withholding 
fee payments or future assignments, were ap-
plied to appraisers. In a survey conducted by 
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Wolverton and Gallimore (1999), appraisers 
responded that while they viewed their own 
role as estimating market value, they believed 
that clients (lenders) viewed the appraiser’s 
role as validating a pending sale price. Hansz 
and diaz (2001) uncovered an asymmetric re-
sponse to transaction price feedback. When ap-
praisers were told that their value estimate on 
a previous appraisal was “too high” (regardless 
of whether it really was or not), appraisers did 
not adjust their next valuation on an unrelated 
assignment. However, when appraisers were 
told that their value estimate on a previous 
appraisal was “too low” (regardless of whether 
it really was or not), appraisers responded by 
adjusting upward their next valuation on an 
unrelated assignment. While acknowledging 
the possibility of other causes, the authors in-
terpreted this result as a routinized response 
to pervasive agent-client concerns. 
These investigations, just described, were 
surveys or experiments conducted under labo-
ratory conditions and, as argued earlier, were 
subject to the criticism that their conclusions 
may or may not reflect actual behavior in real 
world settings. Nevertheless they remain high-
ly suggestive and stimulated the research hy-
pothesis that the judgment of an appraiser can 
be influenced by agent-client concerns to the 
extent that the produced value estimate is not 
recognizable as coming from a population of un-
influenced value estimates. To further the in-
vestigation of this research hypothesis, a model 
of subjective value judgment was specified. 
3. A MoDeL oF sUBJeCtIVe  
VALUe JUDgMeNt
A model of subjective value judgment was 
initiated by defining the following normally 
distributed random variable, subjective value 
judgment, J, of property p at period n by ap-
praiser i: 
Jpni|In–t  (3.1)
where: E(Jpni|In–t) = µJ ; σ = σJ ; In–t = histori-
cal information available at period n 
A potentially upward biasing contaminant, 
C, was introduce into this random variable.
Jpni|In–t, C (3.2) 
where: if C = 0 (has no contaminating impact) 
then E(Jpni|In–t, C) = µJ ; σ = σJ; but if E(C) > 0 
(has a contaminating impact) then E(Jpni|In–t, 
C) > µJ ; σ ≥ σJ; 
The objective market value of property p 
at time n given historical information In–t was 
represented as
E(Vpn|In–t) (3.3)
A population of residuals, R, was defined as
Jpni|In–t – E(Vpn|In–t) = Rpni (3.4)
where: Rpni = a normally distributed random 
variable with E(Rpni) = 0; σ = σJ.
Similarly, a population of potentially biased 
residuals, B, was defined as
Jpni|In–t, C – E(Vpn| In–t) = Bpni (3.5) 
where: Bpni = a random variable of unknown 
functional form and if C = 0 (has no contami-
nating impact) then E(Bpni) = 0; σ = σJ; but if 
E(C) > 0 (has a contaminating impact) then 
E(Bpni) > 0; σ ≥ σJ.
The research hypothesis that appraisers 
can be influenced by agent-client concerns to 
the extent that produced value estimates were 
not recognizable as coming from a population 
of uncontaminated value estimates was stated 
in terms of the empirical model.
E(Jpni|In–t, C) > E(Vpn|In–t) = 
E(Jpni|In–t) (3.6)
or equally 
E(Bpni) > 0 = E(Rpni) (3.7)
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This research hypothesis was tested by 
sampling from the random variable Bpni. If the 
observation was significantly different from 0, 
the research hypothesis was supported. Simi-
larly sampling from Rpni should yield results 
not significantly different from 0. The research 
hypotheses and supporting test hypotheses for 
Bpni and Rpni were constructed below. Note that 
research hypothesis 3.7a is supported by re-
jecting equation 3.8 while research hypothesis 
3.7b is supported by failing to reject equation 
3.10. Also note that research hypothesis 3.7a 
was examined using a 1-tailed test, whereas 
research hypothesis 3.7b was examined using 
a 2-tailed test.
Research Hypothesis:  E(Bpni) > 0 (3.7a)
Ho:  E(Bpni) ≤ 0 (3.8)
Ha:  E(Bpni) > 0 (3.9)
Research Hypothesis:  E(Rpni) = 0 (3.7b)
Ho:  E(Rpni) = 0 (3.10)
Ha:  E(Rpni) ≠ 0 (3.11)
4. DAtA
4.1. observations from  
appraisal populations
The property selected was a 1900 square 
foot, one-story residence located in Arlington, 
Texas. Neighborhood boundaries were well 
defined and the general area was known as 
a mature and stable residential market. The 
subject dwelling, built in 1960, was typical of 
the residential properties in the area. Prop-
erty ownership most recently transferred in 
January 2002 for $122,000 ($64.21 per square 
foot). At time of purchase, the property was 
appraised for $123,000. After settlement, the 
property received cleaning and some main-
tenance (most notably, partial new interior 
paint).
To obtain observations of (Jpni|In–t) and 
(Jpni|In–t, C) six appraisers were hired, in 
pairs, over a five month period and asked to 
appraise the subject property. The first pair 
inspected/valued the property on the 7th and 
8th of October 2003, the next pair inspected/
valued the property on the 22nd and 23rd of 
December 2003, and the final pair inspected/
valued the property on 1st and 2nd of march 
2004. All appraisers were contacted by the 
homeowner and randomly selected from a list 
of local appraisers. For each pair, one apprais-
er (hereafter referred to as a “no pressure” 
or “control” appraiser) was hired to estimate 
the value of the property for decision making 
purposes. No further directions were given to 
the control appraiser. The second appraiser 
(hereafter referred to as the “pressured” or 
“treatment” appraiser) was informed that the 
homeowner required an appraised value of at 
least $150,000 to secure a home-equity loan. 
To avoid overlapping inspections, appraisers 
in a pairing inspected the subject property on 
consecutive days. Inspections lasted between 
30 and 60 minutes and included interior and 
exterior examinations, exterior measurement, 
and photographs. The property was in identi-
cal physical condition for each pairing.
In summary, each appraiser in an appraiser 
pairing valued the same property, at the same 
point in time (within one day of each other), 
and was unaware of the other appraisers. The 
only structured difference was an agent-client 
concern as only the treatment appraisers had 
knowledge that the homeowner required a 
value of at least $150,000. Hard copies of all 
appraisals were obtained and analyzed and 
Table 1 provides an overview of each report.
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4.2. overview of valuation pairs
4.2.1. Valuation pair 1 (october 2003)
The difference between the two value es-
timates (control and treatment) was $28,000 
($14.74 per square foot). The control appraiser’s 
value estimate was $128,000 ($67 per square 
foot), a 4.9% increase over the January 2002 
sales price of $122,000. The pressure treat-
ment appraiser’s value estimate was $156,000 
($82 per square foot), a 27.9% increase over the 
January sale price. In the sales comparison ap-
proach, the control appraiser used four compa-
rable sales ranging in value from $123,900 to 
$150,000. The treatment appraiser used three 
comparable sales with a higher price range 
from $150,500 to $165,500. Both appraisers 
bracketed their value estimate, that is, each 
appraiser selected a set of comparable sales 
whose transaction price range contained his 
value judgment. 
4.2.2. Valuation pair 2 (December 2003) 
The difference between the two values was 
$26,000 ($13.68 per square foot). The control 
appraiser’s value estimate was $124,000 ($65 
per square foot), a 1.6% increase over the Jan-
uary 2002 sales price of $122,000. The pres-
sure treatment appraiser’s value estimate was 
$150,000 ($79 per square foot), a 23.0% increase 
over the January sale price. In the sales com-
parison approach, the control appraiser used 
three comparable sales ranging in value from 
$120,000 to $136,972. The treatment appraiser 
used three comparable sales with a higher price 
range from $136,972 to $175,000. Again, both 
appraisers bracketed their value estimate. 
4.2.3. Valuation pair 3 (March 2004) 
The difference between the two values 
was $13,000 ($6.84 per square foot). The con-
trol appraiser’s value estimate was $137,000 
($72 per square foot), a 12.3% increase over 
the January 2002 sales price of $122,000. The 
pressure treatment appraiser’s value estimate 
was $150,000 ($79 per square foot), a 23.0% 
increase over the January sale price. In the 
sales comparison approach, the control ap-
praiser used three comparable sales ranging 
in value from $106,000 to $136,972. The treat-
ment appraiser used three comparable sales 
with a higher price range from $135,000 to 
$175,000. The control appraiser’s final value 
estimate was slightly above the unadjusted 
comparable sale price range and the treatment 
appraiser did bracket his value estimate. 
In summary, six valuations, in three pair-
ings, produced a range in appraised values from 
$124,000 to $156,000 and it appeared that the 
pressure treatment did have an influence on 
appraiser judgment. However, each valuation 
estimates was an appraiser’s personal opinion. 
To evaluate these subjective judgments it is 
first necessary to estimate the characteristics 
of a population of uncontaminated value esti-
mates by examining the characteristics of the 
population of objective market value estimates 
(equation 3.6). 
4.3. objective market value estimate
Rosen (1974) argued that the value of any 
asset was the sum of the value of the asset’s 
components. He has been credited with con-
tributing to early hedonic pricing theory and 
regression based hedonic modeling has been 
a dominate research paradigm in real estate 
research for three decades (see Cho, 1996 for 
a more contemporary survey of theoretical and 
empirical issues in housing price estimation). 
In this present study, the objective market 
value of property p at time n, E(Vpn|In–t), was 
hedonically defined as a function of the proper-
ty’s unique bundle of characteristics. Regress-
ing a vector of transaction prices against the 
set of property characteristics produces an es-
timation model as specified in equation (4.1).
Ypn = β0 + ∑βkxkpn + εpn (4.1)
where: Ypn was the transaction price of prop-
erty p at time n; βk was a vector of estimated 
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partial regression coefficients on the property’s 
structural, quality, and site characteristics 
(independent variables), xkpn; and εpn was the 
normally distributed random error term with 
mean 0 and variance σ2. 
A data set of 321 single-family residential 
sales was collected from the local multiple list-
ing service (mLS). Because Texas is a non-dis-
closure state and property sale prices are not 
reported in public records, residential apprais-
ers rely exclusively on the mLS for comparable 
sale data. All mLS sales collected were com-
pleted between march 3, 2003 and march 2, 
2004. This time period was selected because it 
represents one-year prior to the most recent ap-
praiser pairing on march 2, 2004. Appraisers 
search for comparable sales, typically, within a 
six-month period from the valuation date and 
usually not more than one-year. The data was 
also limited by sale prices ranging from $75,000 
to $250,000, which was the most common neigh-
borhood price range defined by the appraisers, 
and a geographic area judged to be the subject 
property’s neighborhood, also as described in 
the appraisal reports. Therefore, this mLS data 
set represented a broad universe of comparable 
sale data available to the appraisers.
Independent variables were selected based 
on interviews with knowledgeable market par-
ticipants, including brokers and sales agents, 
in this area and also from adjustments made in 
the submitted appraisal reports. The depend-
ent variable and nine independent variables 
were coded and summarized in Table 2.
table 2. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics








X1 Size dwelling size in square 
feet
321 906 3593 1823.31 563.99
X2 No garage Binary: 1 if no garage; 0 
otherwise
321 0 1 .1246 .3308
X3 2 stories Binary: 1 if two stories; 0 
otherwise
321 0 1 .1526 .3602
Quality characteristics
X4 Time month of sale coded from 
0 (most recent) to -12 
(oldest) 
321 –12 0 –6.0997 3.4218
X5 Age Age of improvements in 
years
321 0 66 36.07 12.91
X6 Age squared Age of improvements in 
years squared
321 0 1467.12 1467.12 789.52
X7 Lamar school 
district
Binary: 1 if property 
located in Lamar 
High School district; 0 
otherwise
321 0 1 .1838 .3879
Site characteristics
X8 Large lot Binary: 1 if lot is greater 
than or equal to .5 acre; 0 
otherwise
321 0 1 .0748 .2634
X9 Pool Binary: 1 if lot has a pool; 
0 otherwise
321 0 1 .1246 .3308
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Size (X1) in square feet was expected to be 
positively related to sale prices. Other size re-
lated variables, including the number of bed-
rooms, bathrooms, dinning rooms, and living 
areas, were considered, however, these vari-
ables were highly correlated with “size.” The 
majority of the properties had either a two car 
garage or no garage with just a few one and 
three-car garages. Because a two-car garage 
was the market standard or baseline, a binary 
variable indicating properties with “no garage” 
(X2) was coded and expected to be negatively 
related to sale prices. The dominate house style 
in this market was one-story (85%), similar to 
the subject property. Above average marketing 
periods for two-story properties were evident 
from mLS statistics and a potential two-story 
(X3) property price discount was suspected. 
The data were arrayed based on month of 
sale and coded from 0 (the most recent sale 
month) to –12 (the oldest sale month). In in-
terpreting the “time” (X4) variable, a positive 
coefficient would indicate increasing property 
values and a negative coefficient would indi-
cate declining values. Local brokers reported 
relatively flat to slightly increasing property 
values in this neighborhood and the “time” 
variable expectation was positive but modest. 
The age (X5) of the property, in years, was 
a proxy for property condition. It was antici-
pated that age would be negatively associated 
with sale prices, as older properties were typi-
cally in inferior condition. Age squared (X6) 
was included to model the decreasing marginal 
impact as age increases. most sales (82%) were 
located in the Arlington High School district 
with the remaining sales located in the Lamar 
High School district. Local brokers and prop-
erty owners indicated a slight preference for 
the Lamar school district (X7), all other factors 
being equal, and a modest price premium was 
anticipated.
About 7.5% of the sales had lot sizes of a half 
acre or more. These “large lot” sales may po-
tentially sell at premiums due to the benefit of 
excess land. Therefore, a positive relationship 
was anticipated between the “large lot” vari-
able (X8) and sale prices. Finally, pools (X9) 
were considered a desirable amenity in this 
sultry climate and a price premium was an-
ticipated. The regression estimates were as 
follows (probability values reported in paren-
thesis):
ŷpn = 50957.43 + 57.47X1 – 10998.58X2 –
         (.000)        (.000)           (.000)     
5059.65X3 + 86.89X4 – 1525.17X5 +
   (.054)        (.730)         (.000)
17.27X6 – 2162.37X7 + 6353.05X8 +
 (.000)         (.341)         (.055) 
10626.66X9 (4.2)
   (.000)
Overall model characteristics were accept-
able with an F-statistic of 197.463 (p-value of 
.000), an R2 of .851, an adjusted-R2 of .847,1 and 
a standard error of the estimate of 15,217.86.2 
Examinations of the model residuals revealed 
no evidence of hedonic assumption violations. 
A vital concern in structural modeling is multi-
collinearity. Because the purpose of this model 
was mean estimation rather than structural 
modeling, correlation among the independent 
variables was a secondary concern. Regard-
less, multicollinearity did not appear to have a 
strong influence on variable coefficients.3
1 For a point of reference, mark Linne, m. Steven kane, 
and George dell in A Guide to Appraisal Valuation 
Modeling published by the Appraisal Institute in 2000 
explain that a regression model used for real estate 
valuation with an R2 greater than 60% is a powerful 
model as a general rule of thumb (see page 50).
2 The durbin-Watson test statistic was 2.014. A test 
statistic of 2 indicates no autocorrelation in the re-
siduals (see page 762 of Basic Business Statistics 7th 
Edition by mark Berenson and david Levine). 
3 All variance inflation factors were low (ranging from 
1.02 for “time” to 1.51 for “size”) with the anticipated 
exceptions of the age and age squared combination 
(13.99 and 14.43, respectively).
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The model coefficients were generally as 
anticipated and statistically significant with 
two notable exceptions. The market condi-
tions trend variable X4 “time” and the location 
variable X7 “Lamar school district” were not 
statistically different from zero (with p-values 
of .730 and .341, respectively). The insignifi-
cance of the “time” variable confirmed anec-
dotal evidence of a trend-less market during 
the study period. Therefore, the same objec-
tive value estimate (at X4 = 0) was used for 
the statistical evaluation of each pairing. Also 
noteworthy, variables X8 “large lot” and X3 
“2 stories” were marginally significant with p-
values of .055 and .054, respectively. The de-
rived multiple regression equation was used to 
calculate the estimate of the objective market 
value of the subject property,4 E(Vpn|In–t), at 
126,503.74 with a standard deviation (s{ŷpn}) 
of 2,036.35. The next section describes the sta-
tistical tests.
5. stAtIstICAL tests
Given the population characteristics for R 
specified in equation (3.4), the following random 
variable, used as a test statistic, was defined:
z = Rpri/σJ. (5.1) 
Note that Rpri = (Jpni|In–t) – E(Vpn|In–t). 
Since E(Vpn|In–t) was unknown, it must be 
estimated using ŷpn. This introduces an ad-
ditional element of variability estimated by 
s{ŷpn}, the standard deviation of ŷpn. Also note 
that with σJ unknown, an estimate, sJ, was 
used and the random variable, defined below, 
becomes t distributed.
t = Rpri/((sJ2 + s{ŷpn}2).5) (5.2)
With estimates of ŷpn and s{ŷpn} provided by 
the regression analysis, only sJ, the estimate of 
the standard deviation of subjective value esti-
mates was needed to fully define the test sta-
tistic. Geltner and miller (2001) reviewed sev-
eral studies investigating appraisal dispersion 
in both residential and commercial appraisals. 
They found an average error magnitude (stand-
ard deviation as a percent of average estimate 
of property value) on the order of 5% to 10% and 
noted that the higher end of the range would 
be appropriate for thinly traded, unique assets. 
Variation in residential valuations should there-
fore be located in the lower end of this range 
with more thinly traded commercial markets 
representing the higher end of the range. This 
argument was supported by the valuation data 
from this present study. The average error un-
der the conditions of the null, the three control 
(no pressure) appraisals, was 5.1%.5 Based on 
the Geltner and miller argument and the valu-
ation data from this present study, the lower 
estimate of standard deviation was more likely. 
However, both the upper and lower limits of 
the estimate were used to examine test hypoth-
eses. This estimated range of 5% to 10% for the 
magnitude of the standard deviation suggested 
a range for sJ from 6,325.19 to 12,650.37.
The test statistic, equation (5.2), was fully 
defined to operationalize both sets of test hy-
potheses (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10), (3.11) and ex-
amine research hypotheses (3.7a) and (3.7b). 
The test statistic calculations are shown for all 
three valuation pairings.4 The subject property is 1900 square feet in size (X1 = 
1900), has a garage (X2 = 0), one-story (X3 = 0), 43 
years old (X5 = 43, X6 = 1849), located in Arlington 
High School district (X7 = 0), does not have a large 
lot (X8 = 0), and does not have a pool (X9 = 0). Note 
that the coefficients in equation 4.2 are rounded.
5 Standard deviation of 6,658 divided by mean of 
129,667.
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5.1. Paired valuation test statistics
5.1.1. Paired valuations 1 (october 2003) 
To examine research hypothesis (3.7a):
Conservative test statistic:
29,496.26/((12,650.37)2 + (2,036.35)2).5 = 
2.302  
p-value = .011 
more realistic test statistic:
29,496.26/((6,325.19)2 + (2,036.35)2).5 = 
4.439 
p-value = .000
Conclusion: The probability that the ob-
served result could occur under the conditions 
of the null (no influence on the appraiser) was 
remote. The null hypothesis was rejected. The 
value opinion of the pressured appraiser was 
biased by the introduced influence. 
To examine research hypothesis (3.7b):
Conservative test statistic:
1,496.26/((12,650.37)2 + (2,036.35)2).5 =
.117
p-value = .907
more realistic test statistic:
1,496.26/((6,325.19)2 + (2,036.35)2).5 =
.225
p-value = .822
Conclusion: The probability that the ob-
served result could occur under the conditions 
of the null (no influence on the appraiser) was 
very high. The null hypothesis was not reject-
ed. The value opinion of the control (no pres-
sure) appraiser came from the population of 
uninfluenced value opinions.
5.1.2. Paired valuations 2  
(December 2003)
To examine research hypothesis (3.7a):
Conservative test statistic:
23,496.26/((12,650.37)2 + (2,036.35)2).5 =
1.834 
p-value = .034
more realistic test statistic:
23,496.26/((6,325.19)2 + (2,036.35)2).5 = 
3.536 
p-value = .000
Conclusion: The probability that the ob-
served result could occur under the conditions 
of the null (no influence on the appraiser) was 
remote. The null hypothesis was rejected. The 
value opinion of the pressured appraiser was 
biased by the introduced influence. 
To examine research hypothesis (3.7b):
Conservative test statistic:
–2,503.74/((12,650.37)2 + (2,036.35)2).5 = 
–.195
p-value = .845
more realistic test statistic:
–2,503.74/((6,325.19)2 + (2,036.35)2).5 = –
.377
p-value = .707
Conclusion: The probability that the ob-
served result could occur under the conditions 
of the null (no influence on the appraiser) was 
very high. The null hypothesis was not reject-
ed. The value opinion of the control (no pres-
sure) appraiser came from the population of 
uninfluenced value opinions.
5.1.3. Paired valuations 3 (March 2004) 
To examine research hypothesis (3.7a):
Conservative test statistic:
23,496.26/((12,650.37)2 + (2,036.35)2).5 =
1.834 
p-value = .034
more realistic test statistic:
23,496.26/((6,325.19)2 + (2,036.35)2).5 = 
3.536
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p-value = .000
Conclusion: The probability that the ob-
served result could occur under the conditions 
of the null (no influence on the appraiser) was 
remote. The null hypothesis was rejected. The 
value opinion of the pressured appraiser was 
biased by the introduced influence. 
To examine research hypothesis (3.7b):
Conservative test statistic:
10,496.26/((12,650.37)2 + (2,036.35)2).5 = 
.819
p-value = .413
more realistic test statistic:
10,496.26/((6,325.19)2 + (2,036.35)2).5 = 
1.580
p-value = .115
Conclusion: The probability that the ob-
served result could occur under the conditions 
of the null (no influence on the appraiser) was 
high. The null hypothesis was not rejected. 
The value opinion of the control (no pressure) 
appraiser came from the population of uninflu-
enced value opinions.
5.2. examination of joint events
Each of the three pressure treatment ap-
praisals can be conceptualized as a Bernoul-
li trial with two possible mutually exclusive 
outcomes, reject as coming from an unbiased 
population of valuation judgments versus fail 
to reject. Because each trial is independent of 
the outcome of the other trials and because the 
probability of rejecting the outcome of any one 
trial, p, can be held constant from one trial to 
the next, the series of three pressure treatment 
appraisals is modeled as a Bernoulli process 
whose probabilities are given by the binomial 
distribution. Setting p equal to .05 and .01 re-
sults in the following probability distributions 
for a process of three trials:
Probability of rejecting a single trial (p) 
 .05   .01
Probability of three rejects in three trials: 
 .000125   .000001
Probability of two rejects in three trials: 
 .007125  .000297
Probability of one reject in three trials: 
 .135375  .029473
Probability of no rejects in three trials: 
 .857375  .970299
Total
 1.000000  1.000000
Using the conservative test statistic (high 
variability) and assuming the conditions of the 
null, that is that the pressure treatment has 
no biasing impact on valuations, the probabil-
ity of an appraised value estimate as extreme 
or more extreme than the first pressure treat-
ment estimate is .011, the second .034, and the 
third .034. The conservative joint probability of 
three valuation estimates at least as extreme as 
the three actually obtained is therefore .000013. 
With realistic individual probabilities of .000006, 
.0002, and .0002, the realistic joint probability is 
2.4E – 13. Comparing these results to the prob-
ability distributions above offers strong evidence 
that the pressure treatment valuation estimates 
did not come from an unbiased population. 
5.3. Recapitulation
Table 3 provides a summary of the obtained 
value estimates and selected statistics. Over a 
five month period the same single family resi-
dence was valued by three pairs of appraisers. 
The date of valuation varied between pairs 
but was constant within pairs. Significant ef-
fort was extended to prevent any one appraiser 
discovering that the property was being valued 
by other appraisers. The only notable differ-
ence between paired appraisers was an incen-
tive/pressure treatment. One appraiser per 
pair, selected at random, was informed that 
the homeowner required a value estimate of at 
least $150,000. The second appraiser (control) 
in each valuation pair was simply asked to val-
ue the property for decision making purposes.
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table 3. Summary of object value estimate and statistical tests
summary of objective value estimate and standard deviation
Objective value estimate (ŷpn):
Observations 321 E(Vpn|In–t) 126,503.74
adj-R2 .847 s{ypn} 2,036.35
Magnitude of standard deviation:
Realistic (5%) 6,325.19 Conservative (10%) 12,650.37
summary of statistical tests
Valuation pair 1 (october 2003):
Control (no pressure) treatment (pressure)
rpn1 1,496.26 bpn1 29,496.26
Conservative stat. 0.1168 Conservative stat. 2.3020
deg of freedom 320 deg of freedom 320
Tailed test 2 Tailed test 1
p-value 0.9071 p-value 0.0110
Realistic stat. 0.2252 Realistic stat. 4.4389
deg of freedom 320 deg of freedom 320
Tailed test 2 Tailed test 1
p-value 0.8220 p-value 0.000006
Valuation pair 2 (December 2003):
Control (no pressure) treatment (pressure)
rpn1 –2,503.74 bpn1 23,496.26
Conservative stat. –0.1954 Conservative stat. 1.8338
deg of freedom 320 deg of freedom 320
Tailed test 2 Tailed test 1
p-value 0.8452 p-value 0.0338
Realistic stat. –0.3768 Realistic stat. 3.5360
deg of freedom 320 deg of freedom 320
Tailed test 2 Tailed test 1
p-value 0.7066 p-value 0.0002
Valuation pair 3 (March 2004):
Control (no pressure) treatment (pressure)
rpn1 10,496.26 bpn1 23,496.26
Conservative stat. 0.8192 Conservative stat. 1.8338
deg of freedom 320 deg of freedom 320
Tailed test 2 Tailed test 1
p-value 0.4133 p-value 0.0338
Realistic stat. 1.5796 Realistic stat. 3.5360
deg of freedom 320 deg of freedom 320
Tailed test 2 Tailed test 1
p-value 0.1152 p-value 0.0002
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Not only were the value estimates provided 
by the appraisers receiving the pressure treat-
ment numerically different from estimates pro-
vided by the non-pressured, control appraisers, 
but the value estimates from the pressured ap-
praisers were statistically different from a de-
fined population of unbiased, objective values 
while the control valuations were not. Consider-
ing the three independent pressure treatment 
valuations as a Bernoulli process also produces 
strong statistical evidence that the pressure 
treatment valuations do not come from a popu-
lation of unbiased valuations estimates and that 
there is a significant biasing contaminant. 
It is also worth noting that the treatment 
applied to the appraisers in the present study, 
a clear request by the homeowner/client, is less 
severe than other possible pressure options 
available to purchasers of appraisal services. 
Levy and Schuck (1999) discussed several tech-
niques clients may use to pressure appraisers 
ranging from withholding fees to threatening 
to withhold future business. To conclude that 
stronger incentives/pressures would evoke re-
sults similar to those in this study is tempt-
ing. 
6. CoNCLUsIoNs
The case that appraisers are subject to 
the influences of their clients and that under 
certain conditions these influences result in 
biased appraisals is established. This study 
presents statistical evidence that agent-client 
concerns influenced the reported value esti-
mates offered by independent appraisers hired 
to provide unbiased valuation judgments. Con-
versely, hired appraisers who were not exposed 
to agent-client concerns provided estimates 
that appeared not to be biased. These results 
support the findings of empirical studies that 
suffer from reliance upon questionable data-
bases as well as the findings of an extensive 
experimental literature subjected to the criti-
cism of uncertain generalizability. The concern 
that under these conditions, default risk will 
be significantly underestimated and passed on 
to the investment community via the wholesal-
ing channel and secondary mortgage market 
operations is no longer questioned. Future re-
search is needed to understand better the role 
of originators in perpetuating a system that 
circumvents underwriting standards designed 
to protect the investing public, but based on 
the emerging evidence, the gate-keeping role 
of the originator-appraiser relationship is dan-
gerously ineffectual.  
Inflated or misrepresented collateral is one 
of the most crucial issues facing mortgage in-
vestors, purchasers of mortgage derivatives, 
and regulators and policy makers seeking to 
repair a damaged financial system and en-
sure its continued viability. A moral hazard 
certainly did exist leading up to the Liquidity 
Crisis of 2008 as appraisers were influenced by 
clients with incentives/pressures to complete 
mortgage financing transactions. The moral 
hazard will certainly not disappear and its ter-
rible consequences will continue to be felt un-
til regulators and policy makers find effective 
ways to discourage and detect the agency-client 
behavior revealed in this study. The method 
demonstrated here represents a research and 
policing tool to advance this quest. 
A comment on methodology is also warrant-
ed. A traditional research design would require 
30 or more treatment observations and 30 or 
more control observations from which group 
statistics would be calculated and compared. 
The ability to collect observations in some real 
estate market field settings is limited. The 
taxonomic approach offers an alternative de-
sign when data poverty exists but population 
characteristics are known or can be estimated. 
Rejection of this study when previously offered 
for publication in 2004 and 2005 was uniform-
ly on the grounds that a larger sample size 
was required to support the results, that three 
paired samples represent insufficient numbers 
to substantiate conclusions. This criticism is 
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simply in error and derives from a misunder-
standing of the procedure employed. The rel-
evant sample size is the number of observa-
tions used to create the hedonic model for the 
population of uncontaminated (unbiased) value 
estimates. The 321 observations actually used 
are clearly sufficient to provide the procedure 
with adequate statistical power. Once the un-
biased appraisal population is established, no 
further observations are needed to draw pow-
erful statistical conclusions about whether or 
not a new observation belongs to it. 
The procedure we employed in this study is 
absolutely analogous to a biologist testing the 
hypothesis that wolves are in a remote valley 
by collecting dNA from animal hair samples in 
the field. The biologist knows the DNA struc-
ture of the wolf population as well as for other 
candidate animal species. When subjected to 
dNA analysis, some of the collected hair may 
prove to be from coyotes or lynx or bear, but if 
one sample of collected hair proves to have the 
dNA structure of a wolf, no reviewer will say 
to this researcher that you need more samples 
of wolf hair before you can conclude that the 
hair you collected is from a wolf. Yet this was 
the exact criticism that prevented the timely 
publication of this research. Now the ques-
tions becomes, with hair samples discovered 
and documented to be from three separate in-
dividual wolves, what is the probability that 
there are no wolves in this valley? In our study 
of agency behavior, we demonstrated that the 
probability of no biased appraisal behavior was 
dismissingly trivial.
Finally, the results of this study, consistent 
with the findings of previous experimental re-
search, extend laboratory conclusions into field 
settings and therefore tend to support the fe-
cundity of experimental methods in real estate. 
Coupled with laboratory work, field study, such 
as the demonstrated taxonomic approach, offers 
noteworthy promise for investigation into eco-
nomic questions that have proved somewhat 
resistant to more traditional approaches.
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sANtRAUKA
GYVENAMOSIOS PASKIRTIES NEKILNOJAMOJO TURTO VERTINIMŲ  
tAKsoNoMINIs tYRIMAs sIeKIANt NUstAtYtI VeRtINIMo PAKLAIDAs
Julian DIAz III, J. Andrew HANsz
Taksonomijos metodas buvo išplėtotas ir pritaikytas taikomajam tyrimui siekiant patvirtinti empirinius ir 
eksperimentinius tyrimų rezultatus, kad paskata arba spaudimas pervertinti yra sisteminė paklaida. Buvo 
apibrėžta tikėtinoji nešališka imtis ir nustatytos statistinės realios vertės. Vertinimai, kuriuose nebuvo pas-
katos ar spaudimo pervertinti, buvo suderinti su imtimi be sisteminės paklaidos, o vertinimai su paskata ar 
spaudimu pervertinti buvo visiškai nesuderinti su apibrėžta imtimi be sisteminės paklaidos.
